David is a natural philosopher. This is particularly evident in his 2016 paper The logic of scientific tests … . The ostensible aim of the paper is to rebut Adrian Kent’s 2010 criticism that in Everettian quantum physics probabilities are merely “decorative”. But its scope is far wider. It is a rich analysis of the nature of scientific theories and scientific methodology, as well as of the meaning of probabilities in physics.
As far as methodology is concerned, David defends a position inspired by Karl Popper’s philosophy of conjectures and refutations. David defends the controversial view that accepting a scientific theory is no different from conjecturing it: experimental results consistent with a theory do not constitute support for the theory. At a time when the Bayesian approach to scientific rationality increasingly dominates the literature, it is edifying to see the Popperian philosophy not just expressed in fresh terms but also tweaked in an interesting and I think fruitful way by putting more emphasis on the fundamental explanatory role of theories.
The treatment of probability in the paper attempts to achieve the seemingly implausible task of turning the tables on defenders of collapse theories in quantum mechanics: it is they, not Everettians, who introduce arbitrary instructions about what experimenters should think. This section of the paper, which relies in part on the important Deutsch-Wallace decision-theoretic approach to quantum probabilities subject to the Born Rule, is extremely subtle. I confess that after many readings I am not entirely convinced me that all of David’s arguments are persuasive. What I can say is that these arguments should be compulsory reading for all those interested in the role of probabilisitic reasoning in physics. In fact the paper as a whole is a testament to the sophistication and profundity of the writings of one of the great modern philosophers of physics.
Happy birthday, David.
As far as methodology is concerned, David defends a position inspired by Karl Popper’s philosophy of conjectures and refutations. David defends the controversial view that accepting a scientific theory is no different from conjecturing it: experimental results consistent with a theory do not constitute support for the theory. At a time when the Bayesian approach to scientific rationality increasingly dominates the literature, it is edifying to see the Popperian philosophy not just expressed in fresh terms but also tweaked in an interesting and I think fruitful way by putting more emphasis on the fundamental explanatory role of theories.
The treatment of probability in the paper attempts to achieve the seemingly implausible task of turning the tables on defenders of collapse theories in quantum mechanics: it is they, not Everettians, who introduce arbitrary instructions about what experimenters should think. This section of the paper, which relies in part on the important Deutsch-Wallace decision-theoretic approach to quantum probabilities subject to the Born Rule, is extremely subtle. I confess that after many readings I am not entirely convinced me that all of David’s arguments are persuasive. What I can say is that these arguments should be compulsory reading for all those interested in the role of probabilisitic reasoning in physics. In fact the paper as a whole is a testament to the sophistication and profundity of the writings of one of the great modern philosophers of physics.
Happy birthday, David.